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Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I am pleased to 
appear before you today to discuss the role of central 
banks and the financial system in the specific context 
of the recent efforts on the part of a number of Eastern 
European countries and the Soviet Union to shift their 
economies toward more market-oriented and competi- 
tive systems.  I am  especially pleased  to have the 
opportunity to discuss these issues in the presence of 
the distinguished group of central bank governors from 
those nations who are gathered with us today. 
For the sake of emphasis, let me begin my remarks 
by citing several propositions that, in my judgment, are 
central  to the discussion as a whole. These proposi- 
tions are: 
The stability of the banking and financial system 
is an absolute prerequisite for the growth and 
stability of the economy at large. 
• First, the stability of the banking and financial 
system is an absolute prerequisite for the growth 
and stability  of the economy at large.  •  Second, of all the elements of structural reform 
that are necessary in the transition from a cen- 
trally planned and controlled economy to a mar- 
ket economy, none is of greater importance than 
the reform of the banking and financial system.  • Third, while the development of capital markets 
—especially  an  efficient market and secondary 
market for national government  securities  — is 
clearly important, the  highest priority  should be 
placed on the reform and adaptation of the com- 
mercial banking system. 
While the development  of capital markets.  ..is 
clearly important, the highest priority  should be 
placed on the reform and adaptation of the 
commercial  banking system. 
• Fourth, successful  reform of the commercial 
banking system  presupposes parallel  reform in 
the central  banking system. At a minimum, this 
reform should take central banks out of the busi- 
ness of directly financing government deficits and 
provide mechanisms through which central banks 
can increase or decrease liquidity in the economy 
without allocating credit for specific purposes or 
functions.  •  Finally, and most importantly, at the end of the 
day, commercial  banks and central  banks have 
only one asset That really  matters, and that asset 
is public confidence.  Accordingly,  the task of 
reform — in  all its detail  — must be approached 
with enormous  weight given to this overriding 
consideration. Indeed, the confidence factor will 
become all the more important over time as the 
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shifts to private hands. The  crucial question is not 
whether particular reforms will work as a matter 
of theory or abstraction, nor even whether a par- 
ticular approach has worked in  other countries. 
Successful  reform of the commercial  banking 
sy8tem presupposes  parallel reform in the central 
banking system. At a minimum, this reform should 
take central banks out of the business of directly 
financing government  deficits and provide mecha- 
nisms through which central banks can increase 
or decrease liquidity in the economy without allo- 
cating credit  for specific purposes or functions. 
the most efficient and effective uses or investments. 
That process is, of course, the very lifeblood of eco- 
nomic development  and rising standards of living. As a 
corollary, it is also universally recognized that the 
banking and financial system must provide the vehicles 
through which payments for goods and services can be 
made  quickly, efficiently,  and  safely  in  a context in 
It is universally recognized that a particularly 
important function of a banking and financial 
system in a market  economy is to help mobilize a 
society's savings and to channel those savings 
rigorously and impartially into the most efficient 
and effective uses or  investments. 
Rather, the bottom line is the issue of whether 
specific reforms are  likely to work and to build 
confidence in the specific context in which they 
are applied. 
Before discussing  these issues in greater detail,  I 
should  make two important qualifications: first,  my 
thinking about  these very difficult  issues is  naturally 
conditioned by my own experience and environment. 
Thus, much of what I have to say reflects how things 
have — and have not  — worked here in the  United 
States and in other western industrial countries. I say 
this because I am  acutely mindful—in  part from my 
association with reform efforts in developing countries 
in Latin America and elsewhere—that successful ele- 
ments of structural economic reform cannot be insensi- 
tive to traditions, customs, cultures, and histories in the 
reforming countries. On the other hand, there are cer- 
tain basics  — even  when considered in  the light of 
national histories and cultures—that  are essential in 
virtually any setting. 
The second qualification follows  from the first: 
namely, I do not consider  myself  an expert on the 
details of the commercial or central banking systems in 
any of the countries whose officials are gathered here 
today. But I do know enough about each and enough 
about reforms already under way to know that much of 
what I have to say will not apply equally in all cases 
and in some may apply in only limited ways.  However, 
even where the latter is the case, I am quite convinced 
that there is value and discipline to be gained in going 
back to basics. 
Against that background, I believe it is fair to say that 
it is universally recognized that a particularly important 
function of a banking and financial system in a market 
economy is to help mobilize a society's savings and to 
channel those savings rigorously and impartially  into 
2  FRBNY Quarterly Review/Summer  1990 
which both the seller and the buyer of such goods and 
services have confidence that instruments used to 
make such payments will be honored and accepted by 
all parties to that transaction and to subsequent trans- 
actions. Without  that confidence, the system  simply 
cannot work. Stated differently, these crucial economic 
functions of mobilizing savings and making payments 
are often taken for granted. In reality, however,  it is 
very difficult to forge a set of legal  and institutional 
arrangements within which these functions  are per- 
formed that would be consistent with the often conflict- 
ing goals of free choice, economic  efficiency,  and 
safety  and stability. 
It is very difficult to forge a set of legal and 
institutional arrangements  within which these 
functions are performed that would be consistent 
with the often conflicting goals of free choice, 
economic efficiency, and safety and stability. 
Indeed, economic history tells us in wholly unmistak- 
able  terms that no society has found it easy to forge its 
financial institutions in a way that these goals are 
appropriately balanced. Even today, within and among 
the most successful industrialized countries of the 
world, there is great debate as to how best to go about 
that task. Certainly, that is true here in the United 
States. The reasons for the inherent difficulties in this 
area are an almost classic blend of political and eco- 
nomic considerations  that have their roots in the crucial 
functions the banking system must perform in a market 
economy. 
As an illustration, take the example of the typical 
household.  Clearly a society's long-term economic 
prospects are best served  when such households make the decision to freely save some of their current 
income. But that is not enough, since there must also 
be a way in which those savings can be mobilized and 
put to work in productive investments. That, of course, 
means  that the household must see  not only an 
inducement to save freely but also an inducement to 
entrust those savings to someone or something else 
that can directly  or indirectly put those savings to work 
in sound and productive investments. Under any cir- 
cumstances, the household will see some risk in part- 
ing  with its savings and  it will  expect to  be 
compensated accordingly. But, and this is a very large 
but, under any circumstances, any household in any 
society will also want to maintain some fraction of its 
savings in the form of highly  liquid assets, including 
assets which can easily be used to finance day-to-day 
and week-to-week transactions needs. 
A household's willingness to entrust its savings— 
especially its highly liquid savings—to some 
institution presupposes  that it  has confidence in 
the financial integrity of that institution. If that 
confidence is not there in the first instance, the 
society's ability to mobilize its savings will be 
compromised and its ability to reap the benefits 
of economic specialization in the production and 
distribution of goods and services will be 
undercut. 
For that reason a household's willingness to entrust 
its savings — especially  its highly  liquid savings — to 
some institution presupposes that it has confidence in 
the financial integrity of that institution. If that confi- 
dence is  not there in the first instance, the society's 
ability to mobilize its savings will be compromised and 
its ability to reap the benefits of economic specializa- 
tion in the production and distribution  of goods and 
services will be undercut. Similarly, if that  confidence is 
lost, households will simply rush to redeploy their sav- 
ings, raising the spectre of a flight to cash and/or to 
hard goods with  all its implications  for inflation and 
destabilizing runs on banks. 
This, of course, is why confidence in banks is so cru- 
cial, and this single factor goes a very long way in 
explaining why banking institutions and banking instru- 
ments have evolved in the way that they have over cen- 
tunes. What this says, of course, is that no matter what 
the precise legal and  institutional financial framework 
in a particular country, there are certain preconditions 
that must exist if the financial system is to be able to 
perform its essential tasks of mobilizing and allocating 
savings and facilitating day-to-day transactions. Thus, 
there must be a class of  financial institutions and finan- 
cial instruments that the public views as safe and con- 
venient outlets for their savings, where at least some 
fraction of those savings are highly liquid and can be 
used to make payments. The problem, of course, is 
There must be a class of financial institutions and 
financial instruments that the public views as safe 
and convenient  outlets for their savings, where at 
least some fraction of those savings  are highly 
liquid and can be used to make payments. 
that any institution that provides the public with access 
to financial  instruments  having those characteristics 
must be one that invests the public's savings carefully 
and prudently, but also invests those savings in a way 
that promotes economic efficiency and growth. 
In virtually all countries, the single dominant class of 
institution that has emerged to play this crucial role as 
both the repository of a large fraction of the society's 
liquid savings and the entity through which payments 
are  made  is the commercial  bank.  Indeed, even  in 
mature industrial countries with highly developed capi- 
tal markets—such as the United States—the commer- 
cial banking system is still the most important single 
element of the financial system, especially when it is 
kept in mind that the capital markets rely very heavily 
on the banking  system for day-to-day  and  standby 
financing facilities. 
But from the earliest days of commercial  banking, 
experience has repeatedly shown that the combination 
of functions typically  provided by such institutions car- 
ries with it the unique risk that a loss of confidence in 
As the broad sweep of history tells us, there are 
many instances in which the loss of confidence In 
financial institutions has caused major damage to 
the real economy. In other words, systemic risk is 
not an abstraction; it can be quite real. 
individual institutions can spread to the system as a 
whole. This, of course, is the so-called systemic risk 
phenomenon. And as the broad sweep of history tells 
us, there are many instances in which the loss of confi- 
dence in financial institutions has caused major dam- 
age to the real economy. In other words, systemic risk 
is not an abstraction; it can be quite real. 
It has long been recognized by all governments  that 
banking and financial institutions must be subject to at 
least some form of regulation or official oversight 
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to economic success, even though these same func- 
tions by their very nature introduce potential risks that 
are capable of undermining the prospects for such eco- 
nomic success. I am fond of pointing out—and I will do 
it again in this context—that Adam Smith forcefully 
took this position in The  Wealth of Nations. 
In most countries there is  either an explicit or a tacit 
recognition that one of the crucial functions of the cen- 
tral bank is to help preserve and enhance the stability 
of the banking and financial system. Indeed, while the 
primary task of most contemporary  central  banks is 
viewed as the conduct of monetary policy, many central 
banks—certainly including the Federal Reserve—were 
established largely with a view toward preventing or at 
least containing financial shocks and disruptions. 
My own vision of the role of the contemporary 
central bank... is one in which the central bank 
houses a trilogy of functions. At the center of the 
trilogy is, of course, monetary policy. But there 
are two other crucial functions of the contempo- 
rary central bank that are closely related to 
monetary policy and constitute a single theme. 
These other two functions are the broad oversight 
of the financial system and the oversight of and/or 
direct  participation in selective aspects of the 
operation of payment  systems. 
My own vision of the role of  the contemporary central 
bank  — framed by a sense of history, by my experience 
in the United States, and by my utter conviction as to 
the importance of the efficiency  and stability of the 
financial  system—is one  in  which  the central  bank 
houses a trilogy of functions. At the center of the tril- 
ogy is, of course, monetary policy. But there are two 
other crucial functions of the contemporary  central 
bank that. are closely related to monetary policy and 
constitute a single  theme. These other two functions 
are the broad oversight of the financial system and the 
oversight of and/or direct participation in selective 
aspects of the operation of payment systems. These 
are  the functions, but the single  theme is stability— 
stability  in the purchasing power of the currency of the 
country  and stability in  the workings of the financial 
system, including the payments system. This single 
theme of stability  is a package deal in that each of the 
parts is dependent on the other  parts. 
But if it is appropriate to think of the role of the cen- 
tral bank in the context of this trilogy of functions, and 
if it is fair to suggest that financial stability is a neces- 
sary—but  not sufficient—condition for economic 
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growth and stability, then it must follow that the struc- 
ture and workings of the banking system are of great 
importance to this process as a whole. Looked at in 
this broad light, the challenge of reforming the banking 
system is  formidable indeed, especially since the paths 
chosen to effect such reform cannot be viewed in isola- 
tion from reforms of the central bank. Neither can they 
be viewed independently of emerging developments in 
capital  markets,  in particular the need to develop 
mechanisms whereby central  governments can more 
The challenge of reforming the banking system is 
formidable indeed,  especially since the paths 
chosen to effect  such reform cannot be viewed in 
isolation from reforms of the central bank. Neither 
can they be viewed independently  of emerging 
developments  in capital markets, in particular the 
need to develop mechanisms whereby central 
governments  can more effectively finance budget 
deficits in a manner that does not constrain the 
monetary policy process. 
effectively  finance budget deficits  in  a manner that 
does not constrain the monetary policy process. None 
of this is easy,  but the greatest challenge may lie in 
forging the individual pieces of the reform effort in such 
a way that they fit together into a cohesive whole that 
will serve the dictates of stability, growth, and confi- 
dence. From this perspective, it seems clear to me that 
the first priority is the mobilization of private savings. 
This,  in turn, brings one's attention immediately to 
the liability side of the  balance  sheet of the major 
financial intermediaries — the commercial banks. 
Indeed, in the short run, I would argue that the design 
of the transactions-like and savings-like liability instru- 
ments of the banks is more important than the design 
of the overall structure of the system. And it is not sim- 
ply the design of the instruments that is important but 
Efficient, safe, and speedy collection and 
payments systems are a must if confidence is to 
be built and maintained.  Indeed, banking 
instruments and institutions are only as good as 
the infrastructure that supports them. 
also the design and workings of the broad infrastruc- 
ture that goes with such instruments. For example, for 
transactions-type  accounts and especially for inter- 
bank movements of funds, efficient, safe, and speedy 
collection and payments systems are a must if corifi- dence is to be built and maintained. Indeed, banking 
instruments and institutions are only as good as the 
infrastructure that supports them. 
The ability of the banking system to mobilize savings 
by attracting deposits is one thing.  But  its ability to 
retain such deposits and to put them to good use is 
quite another, which of course brings me to the asset 
side of the balance  sheet. The bank's choice of its 
assets is crucial for two reasons: 
First,  if the bank is  careless in the credit it 
extends, it will incur losses and will not be able to 
honor its obligations to its depositors. If its ability 
to honor its deposit obligations is in question, the 
bnk will always be subject to the risk of deposit 
runs. This is the subtle  genius of  the banking sys- 
tem, for it is a key feature of the banking system 
tl1at creates the incentive for the bank to extend 
credit wisely, judiciously, and impartially. 
Second, even where capital  markets are  well 
developed,  the  credit decisions  of the banking 
system remain the single most important element 
determining  how  the society's  savings  are 
deployed. Those credit decisions therefore deter- 
mine which firms, which farms, and which entre- 
preneurs  will receive the credit and which will not. 
If the system is working correctly, those who 
receive credit will be the most efficient, the most 
competitive, and the most profitable. Therefore, 
thy will  be the most capable of producing the 
stream of goods and services that will permit the 
economy to grow and standards of living to rise. 
It should be clear that the objectivity and 
impartiality of the credit decision-making  process 
are absolutely indispensable  features of an 
efficient and market-oriented  banking system. 
Partly because of the obvious problems of 
political pressures,  but for other reasons as well, 
the government or the state is not well equipped 
to make these decisions. 
It should be clear that the objectivity and impartiality 
of the credit decision-making process are absolutely 
indispensable  features of an efficient and market- 
oriented banking system. Partly because of the obvious 
problems of political pressures, but for other reasons 
as well, the government or the state is not well 
equipped  to make these decisions. To be  sure, the 
state can establish tax or other incentives for certain 
activities  —  something we see in all societies — but the 
decision as to who gets credit and who does not must 
be left to private initiative in a context in which those 
making the decisions have a major stake—their own 
economic livelihood  — in  the credit decisions they 
make. 
This is also one of the  more fundamental reasons 
that the development  of sound  and  internationally 
acceptable  accounting systems in emerging  market 
economies is so vitally important. Accounting systems 
serve a variety of purposes, but none is more impor- 
tant than their role in helping creditors make the rig- 
orous decisions as to which enterprises can meet the 
market test of efficiency, competitiveness, and prof- 
itability that will permit those enterprises to meet their 
obligations and, in turn, permit their creditors to meet 
their obligations. 
Another subject of importance in regard to the 
structure of banking institutions is the size and 
composition of the bank's capital account....  [The 
capital base] creates a constituent group of 
individuals or institutions that has a direct interest 
in the profitability of the bank, which in turn 
should strongly reinforce the impartiality of the 
credit  decision-making  process. 
Another subject of importance in regard to the struc- 
ture of banking institutions is the size and composition 
of the bank's capital account. The  capital account, rep- 
resenting the ownership interests in the bank, serves 
two obvious purposes: first, it is a source of permanent 
funding, and second, it provides a cushion for absorb- 
ing losses. But the capital  base also serves another, 
more subtle function: namely, it creates a constituent 
group of individuals or institutions  that has a direct 
interest in the profitability of the bank, which in turn 
should strongly reinforce the impartiality of the credit 
decision-making process. 
For these reasons, it should be obvious that private 
ownership of banks is the preferred arrangement. Hav- 
ing said that, I would add that it is also true that gov- 
ernment ownership of commercial banks is quite 
common in developing nations and, in fact, is also to 
be found  in some major industrial countries. Also, in 
virtually all countries—the United States included— 
special purpose banking organizations entailing gov- 
ernment ownership, guarantees, or sponsorship are not 
uncommon. I mention this only because the drive for 
private  ownership of banks may—particularly  in the 
short to intermediate run—have to be tempered with 
some realism as to what  kinds of arrangements are 
workable. Thus, some or all of the initial capital stock 
of commercial banks may have to come from the gov- 
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conditions are also met. Those conditions are: 
First, the management of the bank is indepen- 
dent of the government such that the government 
does not direct credit decisions and allocation. In 
other words, government ownership must not pre- 
clude competition. 
Second, having provided the initial capital, the 
government  is not responsible  for the overall 
funding of the bank. 
Third, the government's  ownership interests are 
structured such that at some later date they can 
be easily sold to private interests. 
While individual countries have considerable latitude 
with  regard to the precise  legal and organizational 
structure of their commercial banking system, the basic 
functions  are common to all countries.  And by their 
very nature, those functions entail  risk taking on the 
part of individual institutions and the system as a 
whole. In the face of that risk taking and the need to 
maintain  public confidence in  the banking system, 
banking in all countries is subject to a higher degree of 
official oversight and regulation than  is the  case for 
most other forms of private enterprise. As an extension 
of that, all countries have put in place some form of a 
so-called safety net that is associated with the opera- 
tion of the banking and financial system. 
In practice, the specific form  of the safety net  — in 
both de jure and de facto terms—can  differ apprecia- 
bly from  one country  to the  next.  In generic terms, 
however,  the safety net is usually designed to provide 
the following functions: first, the regulation of the 
affairs of banking  institutions, usually including  the 
inspection  and examination of such institutions;  sec- 
ond, some form of protection against loss on the part 
would place a particularly high priority on the 
need to develop a strong program of bank 
supervision, especially in the early phases of the 
changing role of the commercial banks...  .The 
central bank can also play a highly  valuable role 
in the early development  of critical aspects of the 
payments system such as the interbank deposit 
market and the emerging markets for government 
securities 
of at least small depositors and investors; third, some 
form of emergency liquidity facility; and finally, some 
form of official regulation  of or  participation  in the 
workings of the payments system. 
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In virtually all countries,  the central  bank plays a 
direct or indirect role in the operation of one or more of 
these central features of the safety net. For example, 
the emergency liquidity facility  is almost always the dis- 
count window of the central bank. In many countries — 
including the United  States—the  central bank also 
plays an important role in both the supervision of bank- 
ing institutions and in either or both the regulation and 
the operation of the payments system. Given the con- 
cept mentioned earlier of the trilogy of central  bank 
functions, it will come as no surprise when I say that I 
strongly believe that central banks should play  an 
important role in both of these areas. In this regard, I 
would place a particularly high priority on the need to 
develop a strong program of bank supervision, espe- 
cially in the early phases of the changing role of the 
commercial banks. Similarly, the central bank can also 
play a highly valuable role in the early development of 
critical aspects of the payments system such as the 
interbank deposit market and the emerging markets for 
government securities. 
Regardless of how broadly or narrowly, how explicitly 
or implicitly the legal mandate of the central  bank is 
drawn, it seems to me inevitable that the central bank 
Achieving and maintaining..  .public confidence is, 
in the first instance, squarely related to the 
success the central bank has in the discharge of 
its monetary policy responsibilities. That Is why 
monetary policy stands at the center of the trilogy 
of central bank functions. It is also the reason 
that central banks must have special status within 
the governments  they serve. 
will always have an important role in helping to build 
and maintain confidence in the underlying stability of 
the banking and financial system. In turn, that neces- 
sarily implies that there must be a high degree of pub- 
lic confidence in the central bank itself. Achieving and 
maintaining that  public confidence is, in the first 
instance, squarely related to the success the central 
bank has in the discharge of its monetary policy 
responsibilities. That is why monetary policy stands at 
the center  of the trilogy of central bank functions. It is 
also the reason that central banks must have special 
status within the governments they serve. At the very 
least, that special status implies that central  banks 
should not be expected to finance the budgetary defi- 
cits of governments directly.  It also  implies that the 
central bank normally should not be responsible for the 
direct financing of other types of enterprise. Indeed, 
such arrangements run the clear risk that the central bank's balance sheet can become weighed down with 
low-quality assets. In such circumstances, confidence 
in the financial integrity  of the central bank can only 
suffer. 
Having said that central banks should not be respon- 
sible for the direct financing of government deficits, I 
should add that it is also true that central banks typ- 
ically are major holders of government debt. But in the 
ideal order, a central bank's holdings of such govern- 
ment debt should arise in connection with its orderly 
efforts to supply liquidity to the economy as a whole 
through open market operations or other suitable vehi- 
cles. This is one of the many reasons that the develop- 
ment of a market for government securities—including 
A well-functioning government securities market 
will serve three vital purposes: first, it will provide 
a more market-oriented  way to finance budget 
deficits; second, It will facilitate a more effective 
approach to monetary policy and the strengthen- 
ing of the balance sheet of the central bank; and 
third, it will provide the foundation upon which 
other elements of capital markets can be 
developed. 
a viable secondary market for such securities  — is such 
a high priority.  Indeed, a well-functioning government 
securities market will serve three vital purposes: first, it 
will provide  a more  market-oriented  way to finance 
budget deficits; econd, it will facilitate a more effective 
approach to monetary policy and the strengthening of 
the balance sheet of the central bank;.  and third, it will 
provide the foundation upon which other elements of 
capital markets can be developed. But as with all mar- 
kets, the development of a smoothly functioning gov- 
ernment securities market presupposes that there is a 
complete infrastructure that will  support an emerging 
secondary market for such securities that, at the least, 
provides the liquidity whereby such securities can be 
readily bought and sold by the central bank and other 
market participants. Without that infrastructure and liq- 
uidity, it will be very difficult to design government  debt 
instruments that institutions and  individuals will find 
attractive as investments and it will be equally difficult 
to free the monetary  policy  process  from  the  need 
either to directly finance government deficits or to 
engage in various forms of credit allocation, or both. 
I said at the outset that the task of reforming the 
banking  and  financial  system  was one of the most 
important tasks facing the countries of Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union.  It is also one of the most difficult. 
In part those difficulties are technical, in part they are 
economic, and in part they are political. But most fun- 
damentally,  these difficulties arise from the fact that the 
reform of the banking system must come to grips with 
that great intangible — public confidence.  It is in this 
area in particular that the role of the central bank is 
vitally important not only in the context of its monetary 
policy responsibilities but also with regard to the inher- 
ent responsibility of the central bank to help ensure the 
essential stability and viability of financial institutions 
and markets. 
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